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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 001342

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015

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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON RSM-56
ATTRIBUTION, MAY 27, 2005

REF: A. 04 GENEVA 3031 (JCIC-XXVI-055)
[1](#)B. 04 STATE 253662 (JCIC-DIP-04-024)
[1](#)C. MOSCOW 3000
[1](#)D. STATE 84320 (RNC/STR 05-126/56)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

- [1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-010.
- [1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: May 27, 2005
Time: 3:30 - 4:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A Working Group meeting with all Parties present was held at the U.S. Mission on May 27, 2005. The U.S. Delegation asked how Russia planned to attribute warhead and throw-weight accountability to the RSM-56, Russia's new type of SLBM in a launch canister. The Russian Delegation responded that Russia had already provided this information during the March 2005 NRRC Consultations, and that it would provide all future notifications in strict accordance with the Treaty. The Russian Delegation indicated that the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement would apply to the RSM-56, but did not give a clear answer on when the process of discussion in the JCIC should begin. The U.S. Delegation asked the Russian Delegation to present, during the current session, the briefing it delivered at the NRRC Consultations.

RUSSIA'S PLANS FOR RSM-56 WARHEAD AND THROW-WEIGHT ATTRIBUTION

[1](#)4. (S) Buttrick thanked the Delegations for their hard work on the four RSM-56 documents, and stated that the United States looked forward to completing them at the end of the first part of this JCIC session. He stated that, during the NRRC Consultations in Washington, DC, Russia briefed that warhead and throw-weight attribution for the RSM-56 will be provided after flight-testing of the missile. The United States attempted to determine Treaty timelines for the warhead and throw-weight attribution process, and found that it needed to understand Russia's plans for deploying the RSM-56. He noted that START Treaty provisions were developed on the assumption that missile development would be conducted in a certain way, and it is now apparent that RSM-56 will not follow the approach envisioned by the Treaty drafters. He gave an example, from the Russian press, which indicated that the RSM-56 may be deployed after a few flight-tests, and may be tested from a deployed submarine. He emphasized that the United States is not necessarily saying Russia is doing anything wrong in the process, but that we are simply trying to understand how Russia is developing and deploying the RSM-56.

[1](#)5. (S) Fedorchenko asked whether the United States wanted a repeat of what Russia briefed at the NRRC Consultations held in March 2005. Buttrick indicated that this would be a good start, as Russia had not presented this information in the JCIC. Fedorchenko stated that Russia briefed at the NRRC Consultations that it would attribute warheads and throw-weight to RSM-56 after its flight-tests, adding that Article III of the Treaty supports this. He said that Russia must first start flight-testing, as currently the missile has neither warheads nor throw-weight attribution.

[1](#)6. (S) Fedorchenko noted that four RSM-56 documents were on the table that brought the missile under the Treaty (REFS A-C). He stated that Russia believed these documents allowed Russia to begin technical arrangements on the RSM-56 in accordance with the Treaty. He said that the lack of these documents, however, would not stop Russia from transferring this missile to Severodvinsk, adding that the RSM-56 cannot

currently be considered a missile under the Treaty because there are no provisions that apply to it in the Treaty. As he saw it, the Parties' task was to work on the documents at the negotiation table. He stated that Russia had provided a list of Treaty problems associated with RSM-56 at the NRRC Consultations, adding that the MOU changes discussed there would be provided to the United States in July of this year.

17. (S) Buttrick reiterated that the sides were in agreement on the four RSM-56 documents and that, if acceptable to the Parties, the documents were ready to be completed. He stated that the United States had no questions on the documents, and hoped to complete them by the end of this session. At that time, the RSM-56 would be recognized under the Treaty as an assembled missile in its launch canister, and Russia could begin deployment and flight-testing. The United States was trying to understand Russia's plans on how it would flight-test the missile, and how it intends to attribute warheads and accountable throw-weight as required under START. He gave the example of the START drafters' vision of missile development involving prototypes. The United States understood from the NRRC Consultations that Russia plans to bypass the prototype stage and go directly into flight-testing of the RSM-56. He emphasized that it was important for the United States to understand Russia's flight-test plans relating to warhead and throw-weight accountability, including whether the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement would be invoked, in order to avoid any pitfalls and confusion as Russia deploys the RSM-56.

18. (S) Fedorchenko replied that he had no directions to discuss plans to deploy or flight-test the RSM-56. He stated that Russia had already provided notification that it had started conversion of SLBM launchers on May 5 (REF D), adding that this conversion was for the RSM-56 SLBM. Russia planned to complete the conversion this year. He stated that future notifications would be provided through official channels, and would be in strict accordance with the Treaty.

19. (S) Kottmyer stated that this issue was a U.S. problem, not just Russia's, as the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement mandates that the Parties come to agreement when certain conditions apply. If a Party deploys a new type of missile before its eighth flight-test, the Parties have to come to agreement on procedures to establish throw-weight accountability. She asked whether the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement applied and Fedorchenko concurred. Kottmyer asked when Russia thought the sides should discuss reaching an agreement.

110. (S) Fedorchenko stated that the first issue to resolve was to capture the missile under the Treaty. He said that a proposal must be tabled at the JCIC on a procedure for calculating throw-weight. He added that Russia could table a proposal on throw-weight, but it would be useless as it would only involve a general approach. Fedorchenko stated that Russia must conduct flight-tests, and only then could Russia discuss procedures for determining throw-weight. After these flight-tests, and once Russia was sure the missile was working, then Russia could table a throw-weight proposal. As Russia had not conducted any flight-tests, a proposal provided now would not work.

111. (S) Buttrick pointed out that the problem confronting the Parties was the requirement to agree in the JCIC regarding throw-weight accountability. The next JCIC may not be until October, and the United States did not understand Russia's plans. Since Russia had not tabled a proposal regarding the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement, deployment of the RSM-56 could be delayed, because no agreement existed to preclude problems with the Treaty. He stated that the United States was not trying to raise a compliance concern; it was trying to facilitate the process, and avoid raising concerns while Russia is in the middle of developing its new SLBM. In addition, Russia must consider the Treaty provisions regarding how launchers are attributed on a submarine after it begins sea trials. Buttrick asked at what point in the conversion process did attribution of the RSM-56 begin and attribution of the SS-N-20 stop for a particular submarine. He added that there were prohibitions in Article V that Russia will also have to consider. He emphasized that the United States was not accusing Russia, but wanted to work in the JCIC to understand how Russia would attribute the RSM-56.

112. (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia had already clearly provided an answer during the NRRC Consultations. Buttrick, noting that many members of the Working Group had not seen the briefing, requested that the Russian Delegation present the briefing this session. Fedorchenko said that he would have to seek authority to present the briefing again. Ryzhkov asked whether the United States had any doubts about the fact that Russia does not have deployed RSM-56s, adding that there is no established legal status of this SLBM. He noted that when Russia notified its colleagues of the RSM-56, Russia was doing so in the spirit of the Treaty because, technically, Russia did not have to provide the declaration

at that time. He added that now a Russian proverb applied: no good deed goes unpunished. Russia had provided all the necessary information, conducted the exhibition, and provided the required notifications. When the submarine was launched, it would be attributed with missiles immediately, even though they do not exist. He said that Russia is acting strictly in accordance with the Treaty. While there were some problems with the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement, the Parties should wait for flight-tests before proceeding further.

¶13. (S) Buttrick responded that the United States did not consider the RSM-56 to be deployed. He said he understood the Russian Delegation's position, but clearly the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement directs the Parties to discuss in the JCIC, and reach agreement on, procedures for throw-weight accountability. Ryzhkov answered that Russia could not do this until at least one flight-test was conducted.

¶14. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed JCIC Agreement on Replacement of Sets of Radiation Detection Equipment, dated May 28, 2005; and

-- Russian-proposed Joint Text on Categories of Technical Data for SLBMs in Launch Canisters, dated May 27, 2005.

¶15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Foley
Mr. Herrick
Mr. Jones
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
LCDR Woods
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Abuseitov
Mr. Baysuanov

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Venevtsev
Mr. Kashirin
Col Razumov
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Kotkova
Col Maksimenko
Lt Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shabalin
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)

Ukraine

Mr. Zakharchuk

¶16. (U) Look sends.
Moley